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Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists  
Loose monetary policy and excessive 
credit and liquidity risk-taking by 
banks 
Steven Ongena   José-Luis Peydró 
25 October 2011 
Do low interest rates encourage excessive risk-taking by banks? This 
column summarises two studies analysing the impact of short-term 
interest rates on the risk composition of the supply of credit. They find 
that lower rates spur greater risk-taking by lower-capitalised banks and 
greater liquidity risk exposure. 
 
A question under intense academic and policy debate since the start of 
the ongoing severe financial crisis is whether a low monetary-policy rate 
spurs excessive risk-taking by banks. From the start of the crisis in the 
summer of 2007, market commentators were quick to argue that, 
during the long period of very low interest rates from 2002 to 2005, 
banks had softened their lending standards and taken on excessive risk. 
Indeed, nominal rates were the lowest in almost four decades and 
below Taylor rates in many countries, while real rates were 
negative (Taylor 2007, Rajan 2010, Reinhart and Rogoff 2010, among 
others). Expansionary monetary policy and credit risk-taking followed 
by restrictive monetary policy possibly led to the financial crisis during 
the 1990s in Japan (Allen and Gale 2004), while lower real interest 
rates preceded banking crises in 47 countries (von Hagen and Ho 
2007). This time the regulatory arbitrage for bank capital associated 
with the high degree of bank leverage, the widespread use of complex 
and opaque financial instruments including loan securitization, and the 
increased interconnectedness among financial intermediaries may have 
intensified the resultant risk-taking associated with expansive monetary 
policy (Calomiris 2009, Mian and Sufi 2009, Acharya and Richardson 
2010). 
During the crisis,commentators also continuously raised concerns that a 
zero policy interest rate combined with additional and far-reaching 
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quantitative easing, while alleviating the immediate predicament of 
many financial market participants, were sowing the seeds for the next 
credit bubble (Giavazzi and Giovannini 2010). 
Recent theoretical work has modelled how changes in short-term 
interest rates may affect credit and liquidity risk-taking by financial 
intermediaries. Banks may take more risk in their lending when 
monetary policy is expansive and, especially when afflicted by agency 
problems, banks’ risk-taking can turn excessive. 
Indeed, lower short-term interest rates may reduce the threat of 
deposit withdrawals, and improve banks’ liquidity and net worth, 
allowing banks to relax their lending standards and to increase their 
credit and liquidity risk-taking. Acute agency problems in banks, when 
their capital is low for example, combined with a reliance on short-term 
funding, may therefore lead short-term interest rates – more than long-
term rates – to spur risk-taking. Finally, low short-term interest rates 
make riskless assets less attractive and may lead to a search-for-yield 
by those financial institutions that have short time horizons.1 
Concurrent with these theoretical developments, recent empirical work 
has begun to study the impact of monetary policy on credit risk-taking 
by banks. Recent papers that in essence study the impact of short-term 
interest rates on the risk composition of the supply of creditfollow a 
longstanding and wide literature that has analysed its impact on the 
aggregate volume of credit in the economy, and on the changes in the 
composition of credit in response to changes in the quality of the pool of 
borrowers.2 
In Jiménez et al (2011), our co-authors and we use a uniquely 
comprehensive credit register from Spain that, matched with bank and 
firm relevant information, contains exhaustive loan (bank-firm) level 
data on all outstanding business loan contracts at a quarterly frequency 
since 1984:IV, and loan application information at the bank-firm level at 
a monthly frequency since 2002:02. 
Our identification strategy consists out of three crucial components: 
(1)   Interacting the overnight interest rate with bank capital (the 
main theory-based measure of bank agency problems) and a firm 
credit-risk measure 
(2)   Accounting fully for both observed and unobserved time-
varying bank and firm heterogeneity by saturating the 
specifications with time*bank and time*firm fixed effects (at a 
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quarterly or monthly frequency), and when possible, also 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in bank-firm matching 
with bank*firm fixed effects and time-varying bank-firm 
characteristics (past bank-firm credit volume for example). 
(3)   Including in all key specifications – and concurrent with the 
short-term rate – also the ten-year government-bond interest rate, 
in particular in a triple interaction with bank capital and a firm 
credit risk measure (as in (2)). 
Spain offers an ideal setting to employ this identification strategy 
because it has an exhaustive credit register from the banking 
supervisor, an economic system dominated by banks and, for the last 22 
years, a fairly exogenous monetary policy. 
We find the following results for a decrease in the overnight interest rate 
(even when controlling for changes in the ten-year government-bond 
interest rate): 
(1)   On the intensive margin, a rate cut induces lowly capitalized 
banks to expand credit to riskier firms more than highly capitalized 
banks, where firm credit risk is either measured as having an ex 
ante bad credit history (ie, past doubtful loans) or as facing future 
credit defaults. 
(2)   On the extensive margin of ended lending, a rate cut has if 
anything a similar impact, ie, lowly capitalized banks end credit to 
riskier firms less often than highly capitalized banks. 
(3)   On the extensive margin of new lending, a rate cut leads 
lower-capitalized banks to more likely grant loans to applicants 
with a worse credit history, and to grant them larger loans or loans 
with a longer maturity. A decrease in the long-term rate has a 
much smaller or no such effects on bank risk-taking (on all margins 
of lending). 
Our results in Jiménez et al (2011) suggest that, fully accounting for the 
credit-demand, firm, and bank balance-sheet channels, monetary policy 
affects the composition of credit supply. A lower monetary-policy rate 
spurs bank risk-taking. Suggestive of excessive risk-taking are their 
findings that risk-taking occurs especially at banks with less capital at 
stake, ie, those afflicted by agency problems, and that credit risk-taking 
is combined with vigorous liquidity risk-taking (increase in long-term 
lending to high credit risk borrowers) even when controlling for a long-
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term interest rate. 
In work with Vasso Ioannidou, we also investigate the impact of 
monetary policy on the risk-taking by banks (Ioannidou et al 2009). This 
study focuses on the pricing of the risk banks take in Bolivia (relying on 
a different and complementary identification strategy to Jiménez, et al 
2011 and studying data from a developing country). Examining the 
credit register from Bolivia from 1999 to 2003, we find that, when the 
US federal-funds rate decreases, bank credit risk increases while loan 
spreads drop (the Bolivian economy is largely dollarised and most loans 
are dollar-denominated making the federal-funds rate the appropriate 
but exogenously determined monetary-policy rate). The latter result is 
again suggestive of excessive bank risk-taking following decreases in the 
monetary-policy rate. Hence, despite using very different 
methodologies, and credit registers covering different countries, time 
periods, and monetary policy regimes, both papers find strikingly 
consistent results.3 
There are a number of natural extensions to these studies. Our focus on 
the impact of monetary policy on individual loan granting overlooks the 
correlations between borrower risk and the impact on each individual 
bank’s portfolio or the correlations between all the banks’ portfolios and 
the resulting systemic-risk impact of monetary policy. In addition, both 
studies focus on the effects of monetary policy on the composition of 
credit supply in only one dimension, ie, firm risk. Industry affiliation or 
portfolio distribution between mortgages, consumer loans and business 
loans for example may also change. Given the intensity of agency 
problems, social costs and externalities in banking, banks’ risk-taking – 
and other compositional changes of their credit supply for that matter – 
can be expected to directly impact future financial stability and economic 
growth. We plan to broach all such extensions in future work. 
Disclaimer: Any views expressed are only those of the authors and 
should not be attributed to the Banco de España, the European Central 
Bank, or the Eurosystem. 
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